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CONVERGENCE ACROSS STATES AND REGIONS 
Abstract 
In this paper we examine the growth and dispersion of personal income 
in U.S. states and regions since 1880 and relate the patterns for 
individual states to the behavior of regions. Then we analyze the 
interplay between net migration and economic growth. We study the 
evolution of gross state product since 1963 and relate the behavior of 
aggregate product to productivity in eight major sectors. The overall 
evidence weighs heavily in favor of convergence: poor states tend to grow 
faster in terms of per capita income and product and within sectors as 
well as for state aggregates. The rate of convergence is, however, not 
rapid: the gap between the typical poor and rich state diminishes at 
roughly 2% per year. 
We apply the same framework to patterns of convergence across 73 
regions of seven European countries since 1950. The process of 
convergence within European countries is similar to that for the United 
States. In particular, the rate of convergence is again about 2% per 
year. 
KEY WORDS: Convergence, Growth, Migration, Regional Economics 
An important economic question is whether poor countries or regions tend to 
converge toward rich ones. We want to know, for example, whether the poor countries 
of Africa, South Asia, and Latin America will grow faster than the developed countries, 
whether southern Italy will become like the north, whether and how fast the eastern 
regions of Germany will attain the prosperity of the western regions, and-·-in an 
historical context-how the American south became nearly as well off as the north. 
Although some economic theories predict convergence, the empirical evidence has 
been a subject of debate. We add to the evidence in this study by extending our 
previous analysis of economic growth across the U.S. states (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
[1990]). We examine the growth and dispersion of personal income since 1880 and relate 
the patterns for individual states to the behavior of regions. Then we analyze the 
interplay between net migration and economic growth. We study the evolution of gross 
state product since 1963 and relate the behavior of aggregate product to productivity in 
eight major sectors. The overall evidence weighs heavily in favor of convergence: poor 
states tend to grow faster in terms of per capita income and product and within sectors 
as well as for state aggregates. The rate of convergence is, however, not rapid: the gap 
between the typical poor and rich state diminishes at roughly 2% per year. 
We apply the same framework to patterns of convergence across 73 regions of 7 
European countries since 1950. The process of convergence within the European 
countries is in many respects similar to that for the United States. In particular, the 
rate of convergence is again about 2% per year. 
We conclude by using the findings to forecast the convergence process for the 
eastern regions of unified Germany. The results are not very encouraging: if the· 
histories of the U.S. states and European-regions are useful guides, then the convergence 
process will occur, but only at a slow pace. 
j 
2 
Framework of the Analysis 
Our previous study (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990], referred to henceforth as 
B/X) studied convergence patterns for economic growth across the U.S. states. We 
based the main analysis on a growth equation that derives, as a log-linear 
approximation, from the transition path of the neoclassical ,growth model for closed . 
economies (Solow (1956], Cass '(1965], Koopmans (1965]). We follow·this research , 
strategy again in this paper; that is, we begin with the closed-economy framework and 
then consider how the model would be affected by open-economy elements, which would 
be important for the U.S. states and European regions. 
We showed in B/X that the transitional growth process in the neoclassical model 
can be approximated as 
where i indexes the economy and t indexes time, yit is per capita output ( equal to 
income per person and per worker in the standard model), xi is the steady-state per 
capita growth rate ( corresponding to exogenous, labor-augmenting technological 
progress in the standard model), Y·t is output per effective worker (that is, the number
1 ' A*
of workers adjusted for the effect of technological progress), y i is the steady-state level 
of output per effective worker, Tis the length of the observation interval, /3 is the speed 
of convergence, and uit is an error term. (The error term is a distributed lag of 
disturbances between dates t-T and t.) The coefficient f3 indicates the rate at which Yit 
A* 
approaches y i . 
On the production side, the neoclassical model assumes diminishing returns to 
capital, exogenous technological progress, full employment, a fixed relation between the 
labor force and population, and exogenous growth of population. With respect to 
3 
preferences, the model assumes that the saving rate derives from choices of 
utility-maximizing households over an infinite horizon; (The infinite horizon can 
represent finite-lived individuals who are connected to their descendants via a chain of 
A*
intergenerational transfers.) Thesteady-statevalue,.yi·' depends,on·the parameters of. 
technology and preferences. We can extend the. notion of technology to include natural 
resources, such as geography, fertile land, and the availability of minerals, and to , 
(exogenous) government policies that affect property rights, the provision of 
infrastructure services, tax rates, and so on. 
The convergence coefficient {3 depends on the productivity of capital and the 
willingness to save.' In,particular, the-source of convergence in the neoclassical growth 
model is the assumed diminishing returns to capital. If the ratio of capital (and hence, 
output) to effective labor is further below the steady-state ratio, then the marginal 
product of capital is higher. Therefore, for given saving behavior, an economy grows 
A* A 
faster the further it is below the steady state, that is, the higher yi /yi t-T in equation 
' 
(1). If we compare different production functions, then {3 is higher if diminishing returns 
to capital set in faster. For example, for a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
capital share a, a smaller a corresponds to a larger {3. As a tends to one, so that 
diminishing returns to capital no longer apply, the convergence coefficient {3 tends to 
zero. This case corresponds to endogenous growth models with constant returns to a 
broad concept of capital, as discussed in Rebelo (1990). 
The parameter /3 also depends on saving behavior, although more on the variation 
in the saving rate over the transition to the steady state than on the level of the-saving ' 
rate. We explore these effects in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (199_1, Ch. 1). One result is 
that a greater willingness to substitute intertemporally tends to raise {3. 
Although the coefficient {3 can differ across economies, we neglect these differences 
in the subsequent discussion. This assumption is probably satisfactory for the U.S. 
4 
states, which are likely to be similar in terms of the underlying parameters of technology 
and preferences. Also, the theory implies that pure differences in the level of 
technology-and hence, the spread. in levels of per capita income that derives from these 
technological differences-do not affect {3. Thus, the convergence coefficients /3 can be 
similar across economies that appear in other respects to be very different. 
We noted in B/X that our empirical estimates of /3 for the U.S. states-somewhat, 
greater than 2% per year-accord with the neoclassical growth model only if 
diminishing returns to capital set in very slowly. For example, with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the capital-share coefficient, a, has to be in the neighborhood of 
0.8. We also argued that this high value for a is reasonable if we take the appropriately 
broad view of capital to include non-human and human components. That is, education 
and other expenditures on people are important parts of the investment process. 
The closed-economy model cannot, of course, be applied literally to the U.S. states 
or the regions of other countries. We discussed in B/X some implications of capital 
mobility. If technologies are the same, then convergence in per capita outputs and 
capital stocks tends to occur more rapidly than in the closed-economy setting, whereas 
convergence in per capita incomes and assets tends to occur less rapidly. Models that 
assume perfect capital mobility tend to have counterfactual implications, such as the 
prediction that the most patient economy owns everything asymptotically and that less 
patient economies eventually have negative assets and negligible consumption per 
effective worker.1 Also, sharp distinctions in the behavior of output and income do not 
show up in our empirical findings. We have considered models in which "imperfections" 
in capital markets imply that only a fraction of physical capital serves as collateral on 
loans (see Cohen and Sachs (1986) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1991, Ch. 2]). In the 
context of the U.S. states, this setting applies if the residents or government of a state 
cannot borrow nationally to finance all of their expenditures on education and other 
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forms of investment in human capital. This type of model predicts that product and 
income eventually behave in a similar manner and that each exhibits the kind of 
convergence property implied by the closed-economy specification of equation (1). 
We have extended the framework to allow for the mobility oflabor. Raw labor 
tends to migrate toward richer economies, which have higher wage rates. This 
movement of persons lowers the capital-labor ratio in places with initially high ratios; -
hence, diminishing returns to capital set in more rapidly and the convergence coefficient 
/3 in equation (1) is higher for given parameters of preferences and technology.2 In other 
words, for given values of the other parameters, the capital-share coefficient a for a 
Cobb-Douglas production function would have to be even higher than 0.8 to be 
consistent with the empirical estimates of {3. 
The rate of convergence tends also to be higher if we allow for the flow of 
technological advances from rich to poor economies (see Nelson and Phelps [1966] for an 
early model of technological diffusion.) Differences in levels of technology tend, 
however, to alter the implications of capital mobility. Human and physical capital may 
move from poor to rich economies and thereby create a force toward divergence. 
We discussed in B/X two concepts of convergence related to equation (1). The 
first, called /3 convergence, relates to poor economies growing faster than rich ones, and 
the second, called u convergence, involves a decline over time in the cross-sectional 
dispersion of per capita income or product. The model implies a form of conditional f3 
A* 
convergence in that, for given steady-state values xi and y i, an economy's per capita 
growth rate is higher the lower the starting level of per capita output, yi t-T· The 
A A* ' 
convergence is conditional in that yi t-T enters in relation toyi' which may differ 
' 
across economies. The coefficient /3 measures the speed of this conditional convergence. 
To isolate /3 empirically we have to hold constant differences in the steady-state values 
A* 
xi and y i. Although we included some additional variables as proxies for these 
6 
differences, we found that the variations in the steady-state values seemed to be minor 
for the U.S. states. These variations appeared to be more significant for a group of 
relatively homogeneous countries, such as the OECD members, and were considerably 
more important for a broad sample of 98 countries. 
A* 
Even if xi and y i are identical for a group of economies, a.positive /3 coefficient 
need not imply that the cross-sectional dispersion of per capita output,·yit,-diminishes>·· 
over time. The positive {3 tends to reduce the dispersion in log(yit) from equation (1), 
but new shocks uit tend to raise it. Equation (1) implies, for a given distribution of uit' 
that the cross-sectional standard deviation oflog(yit), denoted ut, approaches a 
constant u. The dispersion ut falls ( or rises) over time if it starts above ( or below) u; 
hence, /3 convergence (in the sense of /3>0) need not imply u convergence (in the sense of 
A* 
a declining ut). If the steady-state values y i differ across economies, then we could also 
consider a conditional form of u convergence. That is, conditional u convergence applies 
A* 
if the dispersion of the deviations, log(yit)-log(y i ), diminishes over time. Because this 
A* 
concept relies heavily on measures of the y i we have not attempted to implement this 
idea. 
We can bring out the distinction between /3 and u convergence by considering two 
different kinds of questions. Suppose that we are interested in how fast and to what 
extent the per capita income of a particular economy ( or person) is likely to catch up to 
the average of per capita incomes across economies ( or persons). Then /3 convergence is 
the concept that matters for the answer. Suppose, on the other hand, that we want to 
know how the distribution of per capita income across economies (or .persons) has. 
behaved in the past or is likely to behave in the future. In this case, u convergence is 
the relevant concept. 3 
Many disturbances, such as war or shocks to agriculture or oil, affect economies 
differentially. These disturbances tend to raise the cross-sectional variance of uit 
7 
temporarily and thereby raise o-t above o-. Subsequently, if the long-run distribution of 
uit is unchanged, o-t tends to fall gradually back to the value o-. Events related to war, 
agriculture, oil, etc., also affect groups of economies in a correlated manner; contingent 
on one of these events, the uit are not independent draws over the economies i. We used 
regional dummies and measures of sectoral composition of output to address this 
problem in our previous work. That is, we treated the uit' as independent over i once we 
included these additional variables in the regressions. 
The failure to introduce these additional variables can also lead to biased estimates 
of the coefficient /3, contingent on the realization of a particular shock. Consider, for 
example, an adverse shock to agricultural output in a setting in which agricultural 
economies start with below average per capita product. Because of the positive 
correlation of the shock with yi t-T' we would underestimate /3 if we did not hold 
. ' 
constant the shock. 
Personal Income across the U.S. States 
Figure 1 shows the broad pattern of /3 convergence for per capita personal income, 
exclusive of all transfers, for 47 U.S. states or territories from 1880 to 1988. 4 The figure 
shows the strong negative correlation (-0.93) between the average growth rate from 
1880 to 1988 and the log of per capita personal income in 1880. The means and 
standard deviations for these and other variables are in Appendix Table 1. 
One aspect of Figure 1 is that the southern states tend to have low per capita 
income in 1880 and high average growth·rates thereafter. -Less well known is that the 
western states have above-average per capita income in 1880 and below-average growth 
rates afterwards. 
Although regional catch-up is part of the overall convergence story, Figures 2 and 
3 show that the pattern between regions (east, south, midwest, west) is similar to that 
8 
within regions. Figure 2 shows the four data points that correspond to the regional 
means. Figure 3 shows the pattern when the state growth rates and logs of initial 
income are measured relative to the respective regional means. The relations between 
growth rates and starting levels from Figures 2 and 3 are quantitatively similar. 
Table 1 shows regression estimates of the convergence coefficient /3 for nine 
sub-periods of the sample from 1880 to 1988. The first column is a form of equation (1) 
that includes for each sub-period only a constant and the log of the state's initial 
personal income per capita. Although most of the estimated coefficients are significantly 
positive, the magnitudes vary a great deal and two of the point estimates are negative. 
(Recall that we define the coefficient /3 in equation (1) so that a positive /3 means that 
poor economies grow faster than rich ones.) If we constrain the estimate of (3 to be the 
same for all sub-periods, then the resulting joint estimate is /3=0.0175 (s.e.=0.0013), 
that is, in the neighborhood of 2% per year. However, a likelihood-ratio test, shown in 
the table, strongly rejects the hypothesis that /3 is stable over the sub-periods (p-value 
= 0.000).5 
Column 2 of Table 1 introduces regional dummies (hence, three new variables) for 
each sub-period. These dummies proxy for differences in the steady-state values x: and 
A* l 
y i in equation (1) and also absorb fixed effects related to regions in the error term uit. 
Although the fits are improved and the variation in /3 over sub-periods is somewhat 
reduced, the results still reject the hypothesis of stability in /3 over the periods 
(p-value = 0.000). The restricted point estimate, /3, for the nine sub-periods, 0.0189 
(0.0019), is similar to that reported in column 1. The estimate from column 2 reflects 
within-region /3 convergence, whereas that from column 1 reflects a combination of 
within- and between-region convergence. Hence, as also suggested by Figures 1-3, the 
results indicate that the within- and between-region rates of /3 convergence are similar. 
9 
Column 3 of Table 1 adds two additional variables. The first, denoted 
AGRYi t-T' is the share of income originating in agriculture in,state i's personal income 
' 
at the start of each sub-period (that is, in year t-T). This variable is available for all 
of the sub-periods since 1880. As with the regional dummies, the agriculture variable 
A* 
can hold constant differences in steady-state values, xi and y i in equation (1 ), as well as 
common effects related to agriculture in the error term uit· 
The second variable, denoted Sit for structure, relates to the breakdown of state i's 
personal income into nine standard sectors: agriculture, mining, construction, 
manufacturing, transportation, wholesale and retail trade, finance-insurance-real 
estate, services, and government. We first compute the national growth rates of income 
originating in each sector for each sub-period (less the growth rate of national 
population for the period). Then we weight the national growth rates by the share of 
each sector in state i's personal income at the start of the sub-period (that is, in year 
t-T). Hence, the formula for Sit is 
9 
(2) sit= Lwij,t-T•log(yjt/Yj,t-T) 
;_1
J-.L 
where w .. 
~,-
t Tis the weight of sector j in state i's personal income at time t-T and Y·t is
J 
the national average of personal income in sector j at time t, expressed as a ratio to 
national population at time t. Aside from the effect of changing sectoral weights within 
a state, the variable Sit would equal the growth rate of per capita personal income in 
state i between years t-T and t if each of the state's sectors grew at the national 
average rate for that sector. In particular, the variable Sit reflects shocks to agriculture, 
oil, etc., in a way that interacts with state i's concentration in the sectors that do 
relatively well or badly because of th~ shocks. We think of Sit as a proxy for common 
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effects related to sectoral composition in the error term uit in equation (1 ). Note that 
Sit depends on contemporaneous realizations of national variables, but only on lagged 
values of state variables. Because the impact of an individual state on national 
aggregates is small, Sit can be (nearly) exogenous with respect to the individual:error ···· 
term for state i. 
We have the data to construct Sit only since 1929. For that-reason, we·also 
include the variable AGRYi t-T' described above, as a separate influence. We include 
' 
AGRYi t-T for all sub-periods, although the results are similar if we omit this variable 
' 
for the sub-,-periods beginning after 1929. 
Column 3 ofTable 1 shows the estimates for ,B when the two variables, 
AGRYi t-T and Sit' are included in the regressions. The principal new finding is that 
' 
the estimates ,B are much more stable across periods. The greater stability arises 
because we hold constant shocks for some sub-periods that are correlated with initial 
per capita income and also affect groups of states in common. For example, agriculture 
suffered relative to other sectors in the 1920s. 6 Because agricultural states had 
below-average per capita income in 1920, we estimate negative ,B coefficients for the 
1920-1930 sub-period in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1. But, once we hold constant the 
differences in agricultural shares, AGRYi t-T' in column 3, we estimate a ,B coefficient 
' 
for this sub-period, 0.0218 (0.0112), that is similar to those found for the other 
sub-periods. The joint estimate for the nine sub-periods is now ,B=0.0224 (0.0022) and 
we accept the hypothesis of coefficient stability at the 5% level {p-value = 0.13). Thus, 
as noted before, the results suggest ,B convergence at a rate somewhat above 2% per 
year. 7 
The estimates of ,B convergence shown in column 3 of the table are net of 
compositional effects from shifts of persons out of agriculture and toward higher 
productivity jobs in industry and services. 8 These effects are held constant by the 
11 
initial agricultural shares, AGRYi t-T' which are included as regressors. In particular, 
' 
if we add the change in the agricultural share, AGRYit-AGRYi,t-T' to the regressions, 
then the joint estimate of f3 is virtually unchanged from that shown in column 3. In 
general, industry-mix effects matter for the results if shifts of income shares among 
sectors with different average levels of productivity are correlated with initial levels of 
per capita income. It is unclearthat we would want to filter ,out, this kind of effect in 
measuring /3 convergence, but, in any event, our examination of productivity data from 
the post-World War II period suggests that shifts between agriculture and non­
agriculture would be the principal effect of this type. 
We also have regression estimates that parallel those in column 3 but exploit only 
the between-region variation in growth rates. Because we have 4 regions and 9 
sub-periods, we now have 36 observations of per capita growth rates. (With a single /3 
coefficient, this system has 25 independent variables and therefore 11 degrees of 
freedom.) The joint estimate of /3 is 0.0187 (0.0069), which does not differ greatly from 
the joint estimate shown in column 3. Thus, as noted before, the between-region /3 
convergence is,similar to the within-region convergence. We would not get this 
similarity if the states in the four regions differed substantially (after holding constant 
regional differences in the variables AGRYi t-T and Sit) in terms of the steady-state 
•A* ' 
values xi and y i in equation (1). Thus, the findings suggest that the regions are 
converging toward similar steady-state behavior of per capita income. 
Figure 4 shows the (unweighted) cross-sectional standard deviation, at, for the log 
of per capita personal income for 48 U.S. states from 1880 to 1988. (The observation for 
1880 applies to 47 states or territories. The data are plotted for 1880, 1900, 1920, 1929, 
1930, 1940, 1950, and annually since 1955.) We concentrate for now on the data without 
transfers (from all levels of government), which are the figures that we have used thus 
far. 
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Figure 4 shows that ut declined from 0.54 in 1880 to 0.33 in 1920, but then rose to 
0.40 in 1930. This increase reflects the adverse shock to agriculture during the 1920s; 
the effect on ut is pronounced because the disturbance adversely affected states that 
· were already below average in per capita income. After 1930, ut fell to 0.35 in 1940, 
0.24 in 1950, 0.21 in 1960, 0.17 in 1970, and a low point of 0.14 in 1976. The sharp 
decline d1,1ring the 1940s reflects the favorable experience of agriculture. 9 The pattern 
of long-term decline in ut reversed after the mid-1970s and ut rose to 0.15 in 1980 and 
0.19 in 1988. We think that the increase in ut after the mid-1970s relates to oil shocks. 
A later section discusses these effects in the context of a comparison of results for 
· personal income with those based on gross state product. 
The broad observation from Figure 4 is a long-term decline in ut from a value 
above 0.5 to a plateau around 0.15--0.20. This pattern accords with the u convergence 
predicted by the neoclassical growth model if the states began in 1880 with a dispersion 
that was well above the steady-state amount, u. If we use the observed values, a-1880 = 
0.545 and a-1988 = 0.194, and the previous estimate, /3 = 0.02 per year, then we can 
estimate the standard deviation, uu, of the (annual) error term uit in equation (1) as 
0.037. This value implies that the steady-state dispersion, u, is 0.18.10 
One aspect of the high dispersion in 1880 is the low per capita incomes of southern 
states relative to those of non-southern states, a pattern that can be traced back to the 
Civil War. As discussed in B/X, the average income in the south was not very much 
below that in the non-south in 1840, but was about 50% of that in the non-south in 
1880. Another element is that the western states, which were in many respects new 
territories in 1880, had relatively high per capita incomes at the start of the sample. 
Some of this high income represented temporary opportunities in mining. 
Figure 4 also shows the values of ut computed from personal income inclusive of 
transfer payments.11 (Our data on transfers do not separate the amounts received from 
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the federal government from those received from state and local governments.) The 
inclusion of transfers lowers the level of ut because the ratio of transfers to personal 
income exclusive of transfers is substantially negatively correlated with the log of 
personal income exclusive of transfers. For example, the correlation between,the 
transfer ratio and the log of personal income exclusive of transfers is -0.76 in 1987. On 
the other hand, the time pattern for ut inclusive of transfers is similar to that exclusive 
of transfers. The quantitative effect of the transfer component has been increasing over 
time. Although the effect in 1950 is negligible, in 1987, ut exclusive of transfers is 0.187, 
whereas that inclusive of transfers is 0.165. 
We now return to the personal income data measured exclusive of transfers. 
Figure 5 shows the value ut when computed only from the four regional averages for 
each date. The main observation is that the regional pattern in ut pretty well matches 
the pattern across the individual states in Figure 4. Figure 6 shows the underlying data 
on average per capita income for the four regions. This figure shows clearly that the 
average incomes in each region have gotten much closer over time. 12 The main inference 
from Figures 5 and 6 is that a lot of the long-term reduction in ut shown in Figure 4 
reflects the typical southern and western state becoming more like the typical eastern 
and midwestern state. 
Figure 7 shows the patterns for ut within each of the four regions. The long-term 
decline in ut among the western states is apparent, but the other patterns are less 
straightforward. One clear result, however, is that the values of ut within each of the 
four regions are essentially the same toward th~ end of the sample. 
The regional patterns highlight the distinction between u and /3 convergence that 
we discussed before. With respect to u convergence, the narrowing of the gap in average 
incomes across regions is a central element of the story and the changes within regions 
are a side show. In contrast, the estimated speeds of /3 convergence between and within 
14 
regions are virtually identical. That is, relatively poor eastern states (such as Maine 
and Vermont in 1880) tended to catch up to relatively rich eastern states 
(Massachusetts and Rhode Island in 1880) about as fast as the typically poor southern 
state tended to catch up to the typically better off western or eastern state. These 
findings are consistent with the underlying model if the initially high values of o-t 
reflected temporary. disturbances that.affected entire regions-{such as the Civil War and 
the opening up of territories in the west). 
Net Migration across U.S. States 
This section;which extends the work of Sala-i-Martin (1990, Ch. 5), examines the 
migration of persons among the U.S. states in the context of the process of growth and 
convergence that we have been considering. As already mentioned, the process of 
convergence is quickened by movements of people from areas where ratios of capital to 
workers-and hence, wage rates and levels of per capita income-are low to areas 
where they are high. We investigate whether the flows of net migration accord with this 
story and whether these flows appear to be a substantial element in the extent of the 
convergence that we have estimated for the U.S. states. 
Suppose that people ( and hence, workers) are identical and that states offer the 
same amenities, government policies, and so on. Suppose that places differ by initial 
ratios of physical capital to labor and hence, wage rates, and that existing capital cannot 
move. Then people are motivated to move from low-wage to high-wage areas. 
If moving were costless, then;the migration of persons would· equalize per capita 
incomes instantaneously in this model. In fact, moving entails costs, which include 
direct outlays for transportation, costs of familiarizing oneself with new jobs and 
surroundings, psychic costs of leaving acquaintances, and so on. If we allow for 
heterogeneity among persons, then the costs of moving differ in accordance with age, 
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family status, occupation, and other characteristics that affect direct costs of moving or 
preferences about moving. Therefore, not all persons in low-wage areas are motivated 
to leave at a given point in time (or ever). This conclusion is reinforced if we allow for 
heterogeneity of jobs and workers so that wage rates and employment involve features of 
a matching problem. 
The costs of moving into an area may depend on the aggregate flow of persons into 
that area. This rate of flow could influence job-search costs (which would show up in 
properly defined wage rates of new entrants) and also costs of housing. Thus, even if we 
abstract from matching considerations, these elements imply that not all migrants will 
go to the same'place at a point in time. 
If places differ in amenities that affect utility or production, such as climate, 
natural resources; and (exogenous?) government policies, then the long-run equilibrium 
described by Roback (1982) entails a distribution of wage rates for identical workers, 
along with a distribution of population densities and land prices. Although wage rates 
differ across places, these variations compensate for differences in land prices and 
amenities and people have no incentive to move. In terms of the reduced form, the 
equilibrium wage rate and population density for state i, w * i and 1r* i, are determined 
along with the land prices by the underlying amenities, denoted Oi" We can think, as an 
* approximation, of people having an incentive to move to state i if 1r.<1r-( O. ), so that 
1 1 1 
* wi>w i ( Oi). With costs of moving, the rate of migration into state i would be a positive 
* function of the gap, wi-w i ( Oi),-and the derivative of this function would be finite. 
The analysis is more complicated with variable capital stocks. We are especially 
interested in analyzing the effects in the context of our data set, which includes 
information about per capita incomes (which we take as proxies for wage rates) and 
population densities, but not about capital stocks. If starred variables denote steady­
state values, then a place with a temporarily high intensity for physical capital could 
16 
* * * * have wi>w / Oi) and 7ri>7r/ OJ For given wi-w / Oi), a higher 7ri-7ri (Oi) signals that 
current capital intensity is higher and hence, that capital intensity and wages rates will 
* decline over time. In particular, the greater 7r.-7r. (O.) the shorter the expected 
1 1 . 1 
* persistence of the gap between wi and w i (Di) and hence, the lower the-incentive to 
migrate into the state. 
The above reasoning leads us,to write afunctionfor mwthenetrate oLmigration 
into state i between years t-T and t, as 
(3) mit = f(yi t-T' Di, 7ri t-T; variables that depend on t but not i)
' ' 
where the partial effects of y. t T and O. are positive (if a higher O. means more
1, - 1 1 
amenities) and the partial effect of 7ri t-T is negative. 13 We assume that Oi-an 
' 
exogenous characteristic like climate or geography--does not change over time. (Thus, 
the analysis would have to be modified for exhaustible resources like silver or oil that 
get depleted over time or for changing government policies.) The set of variables that 
depend on t but not i includes any elements that influence the national averages of per 
capita income and population density; that is, Y; +_'T' and 71"; t-'T' in equation (3) involve
.L' I.J .1,.L ..L 
comparisons with alternatives available in other locations at time t. The set also 
includes effects like technological progress in heating and air conditioning that affect 
people's attitudes about climate or other components of the amenities, Oi" 
We have found empirically that a simple functional form of equation (3) does 
reasonably well in explaining net migration across states: 
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where vit is an error term, b>O, and the form allows for a quadratic in population 
density, 1ri t-T·14 The marginal effect of 1ri t-T on mit is negative if c2+2c3<0. ' ' 
Although there is an extensive literature about variables to include in 0/5 the present' 
analysis includes only the log of average heating-degree days, denotedlog(HEATi), 
which is a disamenity so that c1<0. The variable log(HEATi) has a good deal of 
explanatory power for net migration; we did explore different functional forms and the 
addition of cooling-degree days as an explanatory variable. 16 But the alternative 
functional forms do not fit as well as the one described in equation (4) and the 
cooling-degree days variable is insignificant. Other components of the vector 0i would 
be important for a fuller study of migration. It would also be useful to introduce 
migration for retirement, a mechanism that likely explains some outliers like Florida. 
However, these kinds of modifications probably would not change the basic findings that 
we now present about the relation between net migration and state per capita income 
and the interaction between migration and the convergence results. 
Figure 8 shows the simple, long-term relation between in-migration and initial 
per capita income. The variable on the vertical axis is the average annual migration 
rate for each state from 1900 to 1987.11 The horizontal axis plots the log of state per 
capita personal income in 1900. The figure shows a positive relationship (correlation= 
0.51), but the relation is not nearly as clear-cut as that seen before for long-term per 
capita growth in Figure 1. Figure 9 shows the partial relation between the long-term 
migration rate and the log of initial per capita income ( after holding constant the 1900 
values of the right-side variables contained-in,:equation (4), as well ,as,regional dummies 
and the agricultural-share variable for 1900). The partial correlation is positive and 
equal to 0.45. 
Table 2 shows regression results in the form of equation (4) for net migration into 
U.S. states. 18 The results are for eight sub-periods, beginning with 1900-1920.19 The 
18 
dependent variable is the ratio of migrants ( annual average over each sub-period) to 
state population at the start of the sub-period.20 Hence, the dependent variable 
approximates the contribution of net migration to the state's growth rate of population· 
over the sub-period. 
The equations include period-specific coefficients forlog(yi t_.:_T) and log(HEATi), 
' 
but single coefficients for the two population-density variables, 1ri t-T (thousands of 
' 
persons per square mile of total area) and (?ri t-T)2. The regressions also include 
' 
period-specific coefficients for regional dummies, agriculture share in personal income, 
AGRYi t-T' and (for sub-periods that start in 1930 or later) the variable structure, Sit•
' . 
These variables are the·ones used before for income growth in column 3 of Table 1. 
(The estimated coefficients of these other variables-not shown in Table 2-are 
sometimes statistically significant but play a relatively minor role overall.) The 
hypothesis of coefficient stability for the population-density variables is accepted at the 
5% level (p-value = 0.34) and the other results change little if period-specific 
coefficients on these variables are introduced. The hypothesis of stability over the 
sub-periods in the coefficients of log(HEATi) is rejected at the 5% level (p-value = 
0.000), although the estimated coefficients, b, on log(yi,t-T) change little if only a single 
coefficient is estimated for log(HEAT/ 
The estimated coefficients of log(HEATi) in Table 2 are all negative and most are 
significantly different from zero. These results indicate that, cet. par., people prefer 
warmer states. For population density, 1ri t-T' the jointly estimated linear term is 
' 
significantly negative, --0.0452 (0.0077), and the square term is significantly positive, 
0.0340 (0.0092). These point estimates imply that, cet. par., the marginal effect of 
population density on in-migration is negative except for a few observations with the 
highest densities (New Jersey and Rhode Island since 1960 and Massachusetts since 
1970). Since the implied marginal effect of population density for these outliers is small 
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.and since we are fitting a quadratic approximation, the true effect of population density 
could be negative throughout. 
Figures 8 and 9 showed that the long-term relation between migration rates and 
initial income is positive, but not very strong. The regression results, which are 
conditioned on the values oflog(y i t-T) and 1ri t-T at the beginning uf each sub-period, 
' ' A 
are considerably clearer. The estimated coefficient, b, on log(yi t-T) ·is significantly 
' A 
positive for every sub""'.period shown in Table 2. The joint estimate, b, for the eight 
sub-periods is 0.0261 (0.0023), which implies at-value over 11. Thus, the regressions 
provide strong statistical evidence that, cet. par., higher per capita income leads to a 
greater rate of net_ in-migration. The estimates in Table 2 do, however, reject at the 5% 
level the hypothesis of stability in the b coefficients across the sub-periods (p-value = 
0.02). 
Recall that we do not use individual state deflators for personal income. We can, 
however, interpret the population-density variable as a proxy for housing costs; these 
differences are a major source of variation in the cost-of-living across states. Thus, the 
estimated coefficients of per capita personal income in Table 2 likely represent effects for 
given costs of housing. It turns out, however, that the jointly estimated coefficient of 
log(yt-T) is significantly positive (with at-value of 9) even if the only other regressors 
in the equations are period-specific constant terms. Thus, the results suggest that the 
measured differences in nominal per capita personal income across states do reflect 
variations in real per capita income. 
Although the relation between the rate of in-migration and lagged per capita 
income is positive and highly statistically significant (holding fixed our measure of 
amenities, population density, and some other variables), the magnitude of the relation 
is small. For example, the joint estimate for b implies that, cet. par., an increase in a 
state1s per capita personal income by 10% raises net in-migration only by enough to 
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raise the state's population growth rate by 0.26 percentage points per year. The slow 
adjustment through net migration means (unless there is a substantial response of a 
state's fertility or mortality) that population densities do not adjust rapidly to 
differences in per capita income adjusted for amenities. Our previous results suggest 
that differences in per capita income tend themselves to be eliminated over time, but 
only, at a rate of about 2% per year. , Thus, disparities in per capitadncome alsac:persist 
for a long time. Putting these results together, the implication is that net-migration 
rates would be highly persistent over time. The data accord with this conclusion. For 
example, the correlation of the average net migration rate from 1900 to 1940 with that 
. from 1940 to 1987 is 0 ..70. Figure 10 depicts ·this pattern of persistence. 
As discussed before, the migration of raw labor from poor to rich states speeds up 
the convergence of per capita income. That is, the estimated coefficients, /3, shown in 
Table 1, should include the impact of migration. We use for comparative purposes the 
joint estimate, /3 = 0.0210, that applies to column 3 of Table 1 for the eight sub-periods 
used in Table 2. We can use the estimated response of migration to 
log(yi t-T)-b = 0.026 from Table 2-to quantify the effect of migration on the 
' 
convergence coefficient. We have modified the neoclassical growth model to include 
endogenous migration as a source of linkage between population growth and the log of 
per capita income. (We neglect here any endogeneity of fertility or mortality.) The 
effect of the migration channel on the convergence speed, /3, depends in the model on the 
underlying parameters of preferences and technology and on the quantity of human 
capital that migrants possess. We use parameter values that are consistent with the 
estimated values of /3 and band with information from other studies (see B/X). If we 
assume unrealistically that migrants have zero human capital, then-depending on the 
specification of the underlying parameters-we calculate that /3 without migration 
would have been in the interval between 0.014 and 0.016, instead of the estimated value, 
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0.021. Thus, migration can account for as much as a third of the estimated speed of 
, convergence ifwe neglect the human capital of migrants. The role of migration is, 
however, considerably less ifwe allow for migrants' human capital. For example, if the 
typical migrant's human capital per person is half the total capital stock per person that 
prevails in the recipient state, then the computed ,8 without migration is between 0.018 
and 0.019. Hence, -ifwe allow for a reasonable amount·ofhmnancapital, then,,migration · 
cannot explain much more than 10% of the estimated speed of convergence. 
We now attempt to get a direct estimate of the effect of migration on convergence 
speed by entering migration rates into the growth-rate regressions. The expectation is 
that (exogenous) in-migration will have a negative effect on the per capita growth rate 
and that the addition of the migration rate as a regressor will lower the estimated ,8 
coefficient. We first enter the contemporaneous migration rate, mit' into regressions of 
the type presented in column 3 of Table 1. We drop the first sub-period (1880-1900) 
and now consider only the eight sub-periods that begin in 1900. If we restrict the 
coefficient on mit to be the same for the eight sub-periods, then the estimated 
coefficient on mit is positive and significant: 0.098 (0.029). The joint estimate of 
,8------0.0250 (0.0027)-is actually somewhat higher than the value, 0.0210, that arises 
when the migration rate is excluded from the regression. Thus, contrary to 
expectations, the estimated ,8 convergence does not diminish if we hold fixed net 
migration rates. If we allow for separate coefficients on mit for each sub-period, then 
all eight point estimates are positive; the hypothesis of coefficient stability over the 
sub-periods is accepted at the 5% level (p-value = 0.37). In any event, the joint 
estimate of ,8------0.0256 (0.0027)-is about the same as that with a, single coefficient for 
A state's per capita growth rate and net migration rate are simultaneously 
determined. Suppose, for example, that a state is known to have favorable prospects for 
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growth, but that these prospects are not adequately captured by the explanatory 
variables that we have included in the regressions for growth and:migration. Then the < 
residuals in each equation would tend to be positive; the positive residual in the 
migration equation reflects the response of migrants to the favorable grnwth 
opportunities that we do not hold constant with the included regressors. It seems likely 
that the positive . estimated coefficients for mit. in the growth-rate regressions· reflect this 
type of interaction. 
We have also estimated by instrumental variables the growth-rate equations that 
include mit as an explanatory variable. Aside fromthe (predetermined) variables that 
enter into the growth-rate equations in Table 1, column 3, we include as instruments 
the additional variables that influence the net migration rate in Table 2: log(HEATi), 
2 21ni t-T' and (ni t-T) . If the coefficients on mit in the growth-rate equations are 
' ' 
restricted to be the same over the eight sub-periods, then the estimated coefficient of 
mit is now 0.010 (0.04 7), which differs insignificantly from zero. The joint estimate of 
,8----0.0214 (0.0030)-is close to the value, 0.0210, found when the migration rate is 
omitted from the regression. The findings are basically the same if we allow for separate 
coefficients on ma for each sub-period. In particular, the joint estimate of /3 is 0.0209 ·~ 
(0.0032). These results suggest that exogenous shifts in net migration rates do not have 
a strong contemporaneous interaction with per capita growth: if we hold fixed 
exogenous net migration rates, then we estimate about the same rate of /3 convergence as 
we did before. These results should, however, be compared with the values of /3 that we 
expect to find when we hold constant the migration rates: between 0.014 and 0.016 if 
migrants have zero human capital and between 0.018 and 0.019 if human capital per 
person for migrants is half the total capital stock per person for the prior residents. The 
differences between the estimated coefficient, 0.0209 (.0032), and the predicted 
coefficients are small ( and statistically insignificant) for the values that allow for human 
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capital. Thus, the results are consistent with the modified neoclassical growth model 
that includes endogenous migration. 
To summarize the main points on migration, we find that, cet. par., per capita 
income has a highly significant positive effect on net migration rates into a state. Thus, 
we verify the predicted response of net migration to economic opportunities. We find, 
however, little contemporaneous interplay between net migration and economic growth. 
Specifically, we observe little change in estimated /3 coefficients when we hold constant 
net migration rates. These results are consistent with a modified neoclassical growth 
model that allows for endogenous migration; in particular, given the estimated response 
of migration to per capita income, the modified model predicts that migration would 
explain only a small part of /3 convergence. 
Gross State Product 
Data on gross state product (GSP) for 48 states are available from 1963 to 1986.22 
. GSP, analogous to gross domestic product, refers to the payments to the factors that 
produce goods within a state, whereas personal income 'pertains to the returns to the 
factor owners, who may reside in other states. The main distinction between GSP and 
personal income arises for income from physical capital. 
Table 3 shows regressions for per capita GSP for four sub-periods: 1963-1969, 
1969-1975, 1975-1981, and 1981-1986. The concept of GSP in this table is the nominal 
aggregate for the state divided by the national deflator for GSP. 23 These figures reflect 
the current.returns to factors of production and are therefore relevant for decisions'on 
investment, migration, and so on. However, the measured growth rates pick up a 
combination of changes in quantities produced and changes in relative prices across 
sectors. The effects of the relative-price changes, which interact with the composition 
of production within a state, can be viewed as part of the error term, uit in equation (1), 
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that is filtered out by the structural-composition variable, Sit' that we discussed before. 
For GSP, the variable Sit is based on a division of production into 54 sectors. Thus, the 
breakdown is much finer than the 9-sector construct used for personal income in 
Table 1. 
Overall, the results on /3 convergence for GSP from Table 3 are similar to those for 
personal income from Table 1. If we exclude the structure variable and include only 
lagged GSP ( column 1 of Table 3) or if we add regional dummies ( column 2), then the 
estimated coefficients /3 are unstable. The estimates are far more stable when we add 
the explanatory variable Sit in column 3. The joint estimate of /3 for the four 
sub-periods is 0.0216 (0.0042) and the hypothesis of stability in the /3 coefficients over 
the four sub-periods is accepted at the 5% level (p-value = 0.64). 
Figure 11 shows a plot of the average growth rate of per capita GSP from 1963 to 
1986 against the log of per capita GSP in 1963. The downward-sloping relation is clear, 
although. the fit is not as good as that for the long period relation for personal income 
shown in Figure 1. The main difference relates to the sample period and not to the 
distinction between GSP and personal income. 
Table 4, which extends the analysis of Sala-i-Martin (1990, Ch. 3), breaks down 
the results by sectors of gross state product. We look at GSP per worker originating in 
eight standard non-agricultural sectors: mining, construction, manufacturing, 
transportation, wholesale & retail trade, finance-insurance-real estate (FIRE), services, 
and government. 24 We have omitted the agriculture sector because data onagricultural 
employment are not comparable to those for the non-agricultural sectors. The first two 
columns of the table show the shares of each sector in U.S. aggregate GSP in 1963 and 
1986. The main patterns in the shares, which are well known, are the declines in 
manufacturing and agriculture ( the residual from the sum of the eight sectors) and the 
increases in services and FIRE. 
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Table 4 shows positive estimates f3 for each of the eight sectors over the period 
1963---,--1986, although not all ofthe estimates are statistically significant. (Each of these 
regressions includes a constant, the log of the sector's productivity in 1963, and the 
regional dummies.) Basically, the /3 values for the four service-type sectors-trade, 
FIRE, services, and government-·-are similar and fall-in a range from 0.009 to 0.016. 
The f3 values are higher for the other four sectors, especially for manufacturing where 
the estimate is 0.0460 (0.0082). It is only this high and precisely estimated value for 
manufacturing that leads to rejection of the hypothesis that the /3 coefficients are the 
same across the sectors. The joint estimate of /3 for the eight sectors is 0.0213 (0.0024), 
but we reject at the 5%1evel the hypothesis that the individual {31s are the same 
(p-,-value = 0.002). We would accept the hypothesis that the /3 coefficients are the same 
for the seven sectors other than manufacturing-the estimate is /3=0.0164 (0.0024) and 
the p-value for the test of equality for the coefficients is 0.77. 
The main inference that we draw from Table 4 is that /3 convergence applies within 
sectors in a manner that is broadly similar to that found in Tables 1 and 3 for state 
aggregates of personal income and gross state product. Thus, an important part of the 
· overall process of convergence across the states involves adjustments of productivity 
levels within sectors. 
Figure 12 shows the (unweighted) cross-sectional standard deviation, o-t, for the 
log of per capita GSP from 1963 to 1986. The decline of o-t from 0.18 in 1963 to a low 
point of 0.13 in 1972 accords -with the behavior for personaLincome shown,in Figure 4. 
We think that the rise in o-t for GSP to a peak of 0.18 in 1981 reflects the behavior of oil 
prices. Especially for 1979-1981, the oil shocks benefit the states that already have 
above-average GSP per capita and thereby lead to an increase in o-t. After 1981, the 
decline in o-t reflects the normal pattern of o- convergence, reinforced later by a fall in oil 
prices. 
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The different patterns from 1973 to 1986 in o-t based on GSP versus o-t based on 
personal income reflect, at least in part, differences in the relation between shares of 
product or income originating in oil-related industries and the levels of per capita 
product or income. The correlation of the log of per capita GSP with the share of GSP 
originating in crude oil and natural gas rises because of the oil shocks from.0.1 in 1973 to 
/ 
0.4 in 1975.and 0.7 in 1981,and then falls with the decline in oil prices to 0.1 in 1986. 
In contrast, the correlation of the log of per capita personal income with the share of 
personal income originating in oil and natural gas is -0.3 in 1970 and 0.0 in 1980. These 
divergent patterns reflect the distinction between the location of oil and gas facilities 
.and the ownership of these facilities. 
From 1973 to 1981 the oil shocks have less of an effect on o-t for personal income 
than for GSP because, unlike for GSP, the rises in oil prices do not particularly harm 
the states with already low levels of per capita personal income. Similarly, a possible 
reason why o-t for personal income does not decline later in the 1980s is that, unlike for 
GSP, the declines in oil prices do not particularly benefit the states with low per capita 
I• 
mcomes. 
Regions o{ Europe 
We now apply the analysis to the behavior of gross domestic product in regions of 
seven countries in Europe. We have data on GDP and a few other variables for 73 
regions: 11 in Germany, lLin the UnitedKingdom, .20 in Italy, .21inFrance,254 in the 
Netherlands, 3 in Belgium, and 3 in Denmark. Table 5 shows the breakdown ofthe 
regions. 
Data for 1950, 1960, and 1970 are from Molle (1980). 26 Data for 1966 (missing 
France and Denmark), 1970 (missing Denmark), 1974, 1980, and 1985 are from Eurostat 
(various issues). The nominal figures on GDP are expressed via current exchange rates 
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in terms of a common currency unit. It is unnecessary to deflate the nominal values for 
the purposes of the cross-section equations that we consider; that is, any common 
deflation affects only the constant terms in the regressions. 27 Aside from GDP and 
population, the data set includes a breakdown of employment into three 
sectors-agriculture, industry, and services-for 1950, 1960, and 1970, and a 
breakdown of GDP into the same three sectors for 1966 (missing France and Denmark), 
1970, 1974, 1980, and 1985. (The data for Denmark on the breakdown of GDP are 
available only for 1974.) 
Figure 13 shows for the 73 regions the relation of the growth rate of per capita 
.GDP from 1950 to 1985to the log of per capita GDP in 1950. (The numbers of the 
regions correspond to those in Table 5. See Figure 14 for a map that shows the locations 
of the regions.) The values shown are all measured relative to the means of the 
respective countries. The figure shows the type of negative relation that is familiar from 
the study of the U.S. states. The correlation between the growth rate and the log of 
initial per capita GDP in Figure 13 is -0.70. 
Because the underlying numbers are expressed relative to own-country means, the 
relation in Figure 13 pertains to /3 convergence within countries rather than between 
countries. For the seven countries that we are considering, the estimates of /3 
convergence between countries turn out to be similar to those within the countries. 
Previous research, which includes Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988), Dowrick and Nguyen 
(1989), and Barro (1991), has considered /3 and u convergence among larger groups of 
countries. Since the seven-country data set considered here provides much less 
information about behavior across countries, we shall focus our-attention on the 
within-country results. 
Table 6 shows regressions for the European regions over four sub-periods: 
1950-1960, 1960-1970, 1970-1980, and 1980-1985.28 The form of the analysis parallels 
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that for the U.S. states from Tables 1 and 3. The regressions in column 1 of Table 6 
include only a constant and log(yi t-T) as independent variables. The estimated 
A • ' 
coefficients, /3, are positive but unstable across the periods. The pattern of results over 
the sub-periods is similar to that found for the U.S. states, and the joint estimate, 
0.0183 (0.0029), is slightly smaller than that found before. The hypothesis of a constant 
/3 coefficient is again rejected at the 5% level (p-value = 0.000). 
Column 2 of Table 6 adds country dummies, which have enormous explanatory 
power for growth rates of European regions. We think of the country dummies, 
analogous to the regional dummies that we used for the United States, as proxies in 
A* 
equation (1) for the steady-state values, xi and y i, and for countrywide fixed effects in 
the error term, uit• The addition of the country dummies in column 2 makes the /3 
coefficients markedly more stable across the sub-periods, but the joint 
estimate--0.0186 (0.0021)-is very close to that shown in column 1. (This joint 
estimation includes period-specific country dummies.) The results in column 2 still 
reject at the 5% level the hypothesis of equal /3 coefficients across the sub-periods 
(p-value = 0.008). 
The results with country dummies in column 2 show within-country /3 convergence 
and are analogous to that shown in Figure 13. In contrast, the results from column 1 
show a combination of within- and between-country /3 convergence. The joint 
estimates /3 in the two columns are similar because the rates of within- and 
between-country {3 convergence are nearly the same in this seven-country sample. We 
can also estimate /3 by using only the data on country aggregates (just as we did for the 
U.S. regions). Then the jointly estimated /3 coefficient for the four·su~periods shown in 
Table 6 turns out to be 0.0183 (0.0029), virtually the same as the value, 0.0186 (0.0021), 
shown in column 2. Note that the first value, 0.0183, is an estimate of /3 convergence 
between countries, whereas the second, 0.0186, is an estimate within countries. 
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Column 3 of Table 6 adds the shares of agriculture and industry in total 
employment at the start of the sub-period.for the 1950-1960, 1960-1970, and 
1970-1980 sub-periods. The regression for the 1980-1985 sub-period adds the shares in 
overall GDP at the start of the period. These share variables are analogous to the 
agricultural share and structural composition variables that we used before for the 
United States. In effect, the share variables for the European regions are as close as we 
can come with our present data to the structural variable, Sit' that we used for the 
United States. 
The main new result from column 3 of Table 3 is the acceptance of the hypothesis 
ofstability in the ,B coefficients at the 5% level (p-value = 0.46). (These results allow 
for period-specific coefficients on the share variables and the country dummies.) The 
joint estimate, ,B 
~ 
= 0.0178 (0.0034), does not change much from that shown in column 2. 
This point estimate-showing ,B convergence at slightly below 2% per year-is 
somewhat less than the corresponding value, 0.0216, found for the U.S. states in Table 3. 
We have also estimated the joint system with individual ,B coefficients for the 
seven countries. This system corresponds to the 4-period regression shown in column 3 
of Table 6 except that the coefficient ,B is allowed to vary over the countries (but not 
over the sub-periods). Thus, the system contains period-specific country dummies and 
the agricultural and industrial share variables (with coefficients that vary over the 
sub-periods but not across the countries). The resulting estimates for ,Bare: 
Germany (11 ·regions): 
United Kingdom (11 regions): 
Italy (20 regions): 
France (21 regions): 
Netherlands (4 regions): 
Belgium (3 regions): 
















The likelihood-ratio statistic for equality of the /3 coefficients across the seven countries 
is 12.6, which coincides with the 5% critical value from the x-2 distribution with 6 df. 
We could try to come up with reasons why the regions in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom have higher than average f3 convergence, ·whereas those in Denmark, 
France, and Italy have lower than average convergence. But, since the differences are 
only marginally significant in a statistical sense, the main conclusion is that similar 
rates of f3 convergence are consistent with the data. 
Figure 15 shows the (unweighted) standard deviation, at, for the log of per capita 
GDP (expressed relative to the mean for the respective country) for the 73 European 
regions; (The data point for 1966 is based on partial coverage because figures for France 
and Denmark are unavailable.) Since we filtered out the country means, the values 
shown in the figure refer to a convergence for regions within countries and not across 
countries. The principal observation is that at for the European regions declined from 
0.28 in 1950 to 0.18 in 1985. The value for Europe in 1985 is still somewhat above the 
value 0.14 for U.S. GSP in 1986 (or the low point of 0.13 in 1972). 
Figure 15 shows that the fall in at for the European regions moderated from 1974 
to 1985. We found somewhat similar behavior for at based on U.S. GSP in Figure 12, 
although the U.S. results showed a substantial rise in at from the mid 1970s until the 
early 1980s. For the United States, we think that we can explain part of the pattern in 
at after the mid 1970s from the behavior of oil shocks; a similar story may account for 
the behavior of at for Europe in Figure 15. (Although the United Kingdom is the,only 
oil producer among the seven countries, the regions of Europe can still vary 
substantially in their sensitivity to oil shocks.) 
Figure 16 shows the behavior of at for the regions within the four largest European 
countries in the sample: Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France. The 
countries are always ranked, highest to lowest, as Italy, Germany, France, and the 
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United Kingdom. The overall pattern shows declines in at over time for each country, 
although little net change occurs since 1970 for Germany and the United Kingdom. In · 
particular, the rise in at from 1974 to 1980 for the United Kingdom-the one oil 
producer in the European sample-likely reflects the effects ofoil shocks. In 1985, the 
values of at are 0.26 for Italy, 0.20 for Germany, 0.15 for France, and 0.10 for the 
United Kingdom, compared with 0.15 for U.S. GSP .• Thus,,although atfor Italy has 
fallen from 0.42 in 1950, Italy still has a way to go to attain the regional dispersion of 
per capita GDP that is characteristic of the other countries. 
The high value of at for Italy reflects especially the spread between the prosperous 
north and the poor··south. A popular view, in fact, is that the backward regions of 
southern Italy will always lag behind the advanced regions of northern Italy (and vice 
versa for the United Kingdom). Our overall findings do not accord with this type of 
story since we find substantial evidence of f3 and a convergence across the regions of 
Europe. For example, with respect to f3 convergence in Figure 13, many of the 
observations with the highest initial per capita GDP (relative to the own-country 
mean) are for northern Italy, whereas many with the lowest per capita GDP are for 
southern Italy (see Table 5 and the map in Figure 14). These observations scatter 
reasonably well around the regression line; that is, as predicted, the initially poorer 
regions in Italy grow faster on average than the initially richer. 
Table 7 shows the full array of data for averages of four prosperous regions in 
northern Italy and seven poor regions in southern Italy. The northern regions began in 
1950 with per capita GDP 70% above the mean for,Italy,.whereas the southern regions 
began 47% below the mean. As predicted, the northern regions grew from 1950 to 1985 
at a below-average rate--0.71% per year below the mean-whereas the southern 
regions grew at an above-average rate--0.39% per year above the mean. Accordingly, 
in 1985, the northern regions were only 38% above the mean, whereas the southern 
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.regions were only 34% below the mean. The relative growth performances from 1950 to 
1985 correspond well to the predicted behavior implied by the jointly estimated value, 
fJ 0.0178 per year, from column 3 of Table 6. That value implies that the northern 
regions should have grown on average at a rate 0. 70% per year below the mean, whereas 
the southern regions should have grown on average at a rate 0.51 %,per year above the 
mean. Thus, there is no indication of something out of the ordinary in the relative 
performances of the regions of north and south Italy. The south of Italy has not caught 
up to the north because it started far away and the rate of fJ convergence is only about 
2% per year. 
Table 7 shows comparable statistics for the north and south of Great Britain. 
(The region for Northern Ireland-a substantial outlier for the United Kingdom-is 
excluded in these calculations.) One immediate observation is that the magnitude of the 
dispersion between the south and north of Great Britain is trivial relative to that 
between the north and south of Italy. In any event, because the six northern and four 
southern regions in Great Britain began in 1950 with similar averages for per capita 
GDP, the theory predicts that subsequent growth rates would also be similar. In fact, 
the north grew by 0.05% per year below the mean, whereas the south grew at 0.07% per 
year above the mean. Therefore, in 1985, the average level of per capita GDP in the 
north was about 3% below the mean, whereas that in the south was about 5% above the 
mean. The theory does not predict this outcome, which can likely be explained by 
sectoral disturbances that affected the regions differentially, ( and in a way that was 
uncorrelated with the initial levels of per capita GDP). 
The Results on /l, Convergence 
A striking aspect of our findings is the similarity in the estimated rates of fJ 
convergence in different contexts. We first summarize the elements of this empirical 
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regularity, then assess the similarity in the estimates from a theoretical perspective, and 
finally show the significance of the results by applying them to developments in recently 
unified Germany. 
We find ample evidence that poorer regions within a country tend to grow faster 
than richer regions, a property that we call /3 convergence. For U.S. per capita personal 
income from 1880 to 1988, we estimate /3 to be around 2% per year whether we look 
within or a.cross four major geographical regions. We also get similar estimates of /3 
when we examine per capita gross state product (GSP) from 1963 to 1986. For GSP, /3 
convergence appears within eight standard non-agricultural sectors of production 
(mining, construction;,manufacturing, transportation, wholesale & retail trade, fire­
insurance-real estate, services, and government), although the size of /3 for 
manufacturing is substantially higher than those for the other sectors. 
The results for 73 regions of 7 European countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark) apply to per capita GDP from 
1950 to 1985. The estimated rates of /3 convergence are similar to those found for the 
United States; in particular, we see no evidence that poor regions, such as those in 
southern Italy, are being systematically left behind in the growth process. For the seven 
countries considered in this study, the cross-country estimates of {3 are similar to the 
within-country estimates. 
We have obtained estimates of /3 for a broader cross section of countries in the 
post-World War II period: one sample contains 20 OECD countries and another 
comprises a less homogeneous group of 98 countries. If we examine only the simple 
relation between the per capita growth rate and initial per capita GDP, then the 
estimates of /3 are around 1% per year for the OECD sample and about Ofor the larger 
sample. Recall, however, that the neoclassical growth model summarized by equation 
(1) predicts a conditional form of convergence in which differences in per capita product 
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A* 
enter relative to differences in steady-state positions, y i and xi. If we hold constant 
additional variables that we interpret as proxies for differences across countries in 
steady-state positions, then we again obtain estimates of {3 in the neighborhood of 2% 
per year (see Barro and Sala-i-,-Martin (1991, Table 5]). These results suggest that the 
A*
ranking of the divergence in the steady-state values, yi and xi' goes from the 
heterogeneous collectiorrof 98 countries at the top to the relatively homogeneous OECD 
countries to the still more homogeneous regions within the United States or the seven 
European countries. In the regional context, our long-period estimates of {3 depend 
little on whether we hold constant proxies for steady-state values, a result that suggests 
little regional variation of steady-state values within the countries that we have 
studied. 
The neoclassical growth model does not imply that the convergence coefficient, {3, 
would be the same in all times and places. The coefficient depends, as we discussed 
before, on the underlying parameters of technology and preferences, but not on 
differences in technologies or government policies that can be represented as 
proportional effects on the production function, that is, as variations in the parameter A 
in the function, Af(k). These A-type effects have important influences on steady-state 
A* 
output per worker, y i, but not on the speed with which an economy approaches its 
steady state. Therefore, economies that differ greatly in some respects may nevertheless 
exhibit similar rates of {3 convergence. 
We noted that a greater degree of labor mobility leads theoretically to a higher 
convergence coefficient {3. This effect means that the rates of {3 convergence would be 
higher for regions of countries than across countries. Direct estimates for the effect of 
net migration across the U.S. states indicate, however, that this effect is small. In 
particular, the magnitude of the effect is not large enough to generate a statistically 
detectable gap between the /3 coefficients for regions and countries. 
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Capital mobility also tends to be greater across regions than across countries. The 
effects ofcapital mobility on /3 convergence are, however, difficult to pin down. With 
identical technologies, capital mobility speeds.up convergence for per capita product but 
slows down convergence for per capita income. Our results forthe U.S. states show 
little distinction in the dynamics of product and income, ,an observation that induces us 
to deemphasize capital mobility. Also, if technologies (including government policies) 
differ across economies, then capital may move from poor to rich economies and lead 
thereby to divergence of per capita product. Thus, it is not obvious that greater capital 
mobility across regions than across countries would lead to higher rates of /3 convergence 
for.regions than countries. 
Suppose that, despite the theoretical ambiguities, we take it as an empirical 
regularity that the rate of /3 convergence is roughly 2% per year in a variety of 
circumstances. We can highlight the potential significance of this finding by showing 
how it applies to the recent merger of East and West Germany, the topic of the paper at 
this conference by Akerlof, et al (1991). Suppose that the ratio of the west's per capita 
income to the east's in 1990 is two, the order of magnitude suggested by Akerlof, et al. 
A coefficient /3 of 2% per year implies that the east's per capita income would grow 
initially by 1.4% per year higher than the west. 29 The half-life of this convergence 
process is 35 years; that is, it would take 35 years for half of the initial east-west gap to 
be eliminated. Thus, the results extrapolated from our findings for regions of the United 
States and Europe and for a variety of countriesimplythat anything close to "parity" in 
the short run is unimaginable. 
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Footnotes 
*We have benefited from support of research by the National Science Foundation and 
the Bradley Foundation ... We.appreciate comments on this·and•related•research-from 
members of the Brookings Panel ,and from Gary Becker, Olivier Blanchard, Paul David, 
Steve Durlauf, Susan Guthrie, CaroLHeim, Anne Krueger, Edward Lazear, Bob Lucas, 
Greg Mankiw, Kevin M. Murphy, Danny Quah, Sergio Rebelo, and Gavin Wright. We 
also appreciate research assistance from Michael Kremer and Casey Mulligan. 
1Some of the counterfactual results in open--Bconomy models with perfect capital markets 
disappear if we assume that people become less patient as they raise assets and 
consumption (see Uzawa [1968]). This form of preferences is introspectively unappealing, 
but Blanchard (1985) shows that the aggregation across finite-lived individuals makes 
overall economies act this way. In particular, the initially most patient economy stops 
short of owning everything in the long run and the less patient economies do not tend 
toward zero consumption per effective worker. Assets are, however, still likely to become 
negative for less patient economies. 
2Convergence can be less rapid if immigrants to rich economies are substantially above 
average in human capital. See Borjas (1990) for a discussion of the characteristics of 
immigrants. 
3Quah (1990) discusses {3 and u convergence in terms of Galton1s,Fallacy:, the observation 
that heights of persons in a family regress to the mean across generations ( a form of /j 
convergence) does not imply that the dispersion of heights across the population diminishes 
over time (which would be an example of u convergence). None of this makes {3 
convergence uninteresting, as Quah seems to suggest; it just points out that {3 and u 
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convergence are different concepts. One example of the Quah-Galton effect is the ordinal 
rankings of teams in a sports league. Although at is constant by definition (so a 
convergence cannot apply), we can still think of /3 convergence in terms of how rapidly 
teams at the bottom of the ranking tend to rebound toward the middle or how quickly 
champions tend to revert to mediocrity. The sports example also leads naturally to the 
issue of overshooting: is a currently weak team or country likely to be in a better position 
than a currently strong team or country at some future date? In the Quah-Galton 
context, if person 1 is taller than person 2, would we predict that the offsprings of person 2 
would eventually be taller than those of person 1? This type of overshooting cannot obtain 
in the ·standard"-neoclassical growth model, which generates a first-order differential 
equation that is approximated in the linear, log-difference form of equation (1). Thus, if xi 
and y * i are the same for all i, then if economy 1 starts out ahead of economy 2 we would 
predict that economy 1 would still be ahead of economy 2 at any date in the future. Our 
conjecture is that heights also satisfy this property, although we have not examined the 
data. The possibility of overshooting seems more likely for the rankings of sports teams; in 
fact, this area may be the best place to apply models of overshooting. For an overview of 
these models, see The Economist (1990). 
4The data on personal income are from Bureau of Economic Analysis (1986), recent issues of 
U.S. Survey of Current Business, and Easterlin (1957, 1960). See B/X for a discussion. 
There are no data for Oklahoma for 1880 (which preceded the Oklahoma land rush) and we 
exclude Alaska, Hawaii,,and.Washington,D.C.~throughoutthe analysis.· ·We use nominal 
income figures deflated by the overall CPI. If the price level is the same for all states at 
each point in time, then we can just as .well use nominal income figures for the 
cross-sectional analysis that we carry out. If prices differ across, states at a point in 
time--that is, if there are departures from purchasing-power parity-then it would be 
preferable to use individual-state deflators. We think, however, that the available price 
41 
indexes across states do not improve on the assumption of a common price level. (The 
analysis requires only constant relative prices for -growth rates,<but equal levels· of prices for 
levels of real income.) 
5These results come from iterative, weighted, non-"-linear least· squares, which allows for 
heteroscedasticity across the sub-periods but not for correlation of the error terms over the 
periods. We have also estimated systems that allow for this correlation, using seemingly­
unrelated regression or SUR. In most cases, the results of hypothesis tests are similar. In 
some cases, however, we had difficulty with convergence of the estimates because of the 
interaction of the non-linearity in the model with the large number of parameters 
introduced by the SUR procedure. Probably it would be better to estimate parsimonious 
representations that allow for a restricted form of serial correlation in the errors, rather . · 
than an arbitrary pattern across the sub-periods. 
6The ratio of the WPI for farm products to the CPI for all items fell at a rate of 3.5% per 
year from 1920 to 1930. Over that period, the average growth rate of real per capita farm 
income-nominal income divided by the CPI and farm population-was -2.7% per year. 
In contrast, the average growth rate of real per capita non-farm personal income was 0.8% 
per year. The data are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1973, 1975). 
71t is well known that temporary measurement error in yit can lead to an overestimate of 
the convergence coefficient {3. In previous research we have taken several approaches to 
assessing the likely magnitude of this effect (see Barro [1991] and B/X). In one approach 
we related the growth rate, (1/T)•log(yit/Yi t-T), to income at a date prior to t-T, say to 
' 
log(yi t-T-T'). If measurement error does not persist over an interval greater than T' 
' 
(which we took to be five or ten years), then with a plausible magnitude for /3, the 
asymptotic bias in this form is in the direction opposite to that in the original form. 
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Because the empirical estimates of (3 from the two forms did not differ greatly we argued 
that the effects of measurment error were unlikely to be major. 
8We do not have reliable data on agricultural employment but the data on farm population 
suggest that this productivity differential is large, at least in earlier years. We measure 
farm productivity as farm national income divided by farm population and non-farm 
productivity as non-farm national income divided by non-farm population. Using these 
concepts of productivity, the ratio of non-farm to farm productivity was 4.0 in 1889, 2.7 in 
1899, 2.3 in 1909, 2.9 in 1920, 3.6 in 1930, 3. 7 in 1940, 2.4 in 1960, 1.8 in 1970, 1.6 in 1980, 
and 1.5 in 1988. The data are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1973, 1975) and 
Statistical Abstract, 1990. One shortcoming of these measures of productivity is that they 
do not adjust for differences in family size between farm and non-farm populations. 
9The ratio of the WPI for farm products to the CPI for all items grew at an average annual 
rate of 9.5% from 1940 to 1950. Over this period, the average growth rate of real per 
capita farm income (nominal income divided by the CPI and farm populaton) was 7.8% per 
year, compared to 2.9% per year for real per capita non-farm personal income. The data 
are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975). 
10To estimate uu we use the first-difference equation for u~, derived in B/X, 
2 2/(1-€-2/3) [ 2 uu -2/3t.ut = uu + uO -
2/(1-€-2/3)] · e The steady-state variance, u2 , equals 
the first term in this formula, u~/(1-€-2/3). 
11We have the data on transfers only from the Commerce Department data that begin in 
1929. Since the amounts for earlier years are small, the behavior of ut with and without 
transfers would be similar before 1929. 
12See Easterlin (1957) and Borts and Stein (1964, Ch. 2) for related analyses of the regional 
dispersion of per capita personal income. 
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13See Mueser and Graves (1990) for a related model of migration. 
14Population density is the ratio of state population to total area (land plus water). The 
data on area are from U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, 1990. 
15See, for example, Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn [1988]. Some of the variables that they 
consider, such as criminal activity, are, however, not exogenous in the same sense as 
climate or geography. 
16The data on heating- and cooling-degree days refer to average temperatures from 1951 to 
1980 and are from U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, 1990. 
17The variable is the average of the rates for the subperiods, 1900-1920, 1920-1930, ... , 
1970-1980, 1980-1987, weighted by the lengths of each interval.. The rate for each 
sub-period is 
\ 
the annual average of net migration divided by state population at the start 
of the sub-period. 
18The regressions use iterative, weighted least squares. 
19The overall results do not change greatly if we add the sub-period, 1880-1900. This 
sub-period includes some enormous rates of in-migration that correspond to the opening 
up of new territories. Because our simple functional form does not fit well in this range we 
decided to exclude this sub-period from the present analysis. 
20The data on migration are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975). Recent figures are 
computed from data on population, births, and deaths from U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Statistical Abstract, various issues. 
21The assumption here is that the instrumental variables, log(HEATi) and ni t-T' do not 
' 
enter directly as influences on per capita growth. 
22The data are from Renshaw; Trott, and Friedenberg (1988). See B/X for a discussion. 
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23Individual state deflators are unavailable. Since we use a common deflator at each point in 
time, the particular deflator that we use affects only the constant term in.theregressions. 
Seen. 4. 
24The data on employment by sector are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
25We lost one region for France because some of the data on Corse are combined with those 
for Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur. 
26We appreciate the suggestion from Carol Heim to look at these data. 
27Departures from purchasing-power parity across countries would not affect our main 
results, which filter out,own-country effects. The growth rates for regions within countries 
involve the same kind of sensitivity to changes in relative prices that applied to GSP for 
the U.S. states. 
2swe have two alternative sources of GDP for 1970-Molle (1980) and Eurostat-and the 
two sources do not coincide. We computed the figures for 1960-1970 from Molle and those 
for 1970-1980 from Eurostat. Since the correlation between the two measures of the levels 
of per capita GDP in 1970 is 0.988, this discrepancy should not be important. 
29We can also use the findings for the United States (Table 2) to estimate net migration 
from the east of Germany to the west. The resulting estimate (which allows for the 
differences in per capita income and population density, but not for differences in 
amenities) is that 1.2% or 203,000 of the eastern population would migrate over a year 
to the west. Akerlof, et al (1991, Table 9) show that.the net out-migration from the 
east averaged 22,800 per month over the three months since the unification in July 1990. 
Although the actual flow of 274,000 at an annual rate exceeds our estimate of 203,000, 
the extrapolation of the U.S. experience to Germany does provide a reasonable order of 
magnitude. 
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Table 1: Regressions for Personal Income across U.S. States 
(1) (2) (3) 
No other var's. Regional dums. Regional dums., 
AGRY, structure 
Period /3 R2 [;] /3 R2 [;] p R2 [;] 
1880-1900 .0101 .36 .0224 .62 .0268 .65 
(.0022) [.0068] (. 0040) [. 0054] (. 0048) [. 0053] 
1900-1920 .0218 .62 .0209 .67 .0269 .71 
(.0032) [.0065] (. 0063) [. 0062] (. 0075) [. 0060] 
1920-1930 - .0149 .14 - .0122 .43 .0218 .64 
(.0051) [.0132] (. 0074) [. 0111] (. 0112) [. 0089] 
1930-1940 .0141 .35 .0127 .36 .0119 .46 
(. 0030) [. 0073] (.0051) [.0075] (.0072) [.0071] 
1940-1950 .0431 .72 .0373 .86 .0236 .89 
(. 0048) [. 0078] (. 0053) [. 0057] (. 0060) [. 0053] 
1950- 1960 .0190 .42 .0202 .49 .0305 .66 
(.0035) [.0050] (.0052) [.0048] ( . 0054) [.0041] 
1960- 1970 .0246 .51 .0135 .68 .0173 .72 
(. 0039) [. 0045] (. 0043) [. 0037] (. 0053) [. 0036] 
1970- 1980 .0198 .21 .0119 .36 .0042 .46 
(.0062) [.0060] (. 0069) [. 0056] (.0070) [.0052] 
1980-1988 - .0060 .00 - .0005 .51 .0146 .76 
(.0130) [.0142] (.0114) [.0103] (. 0099) [. 0075] 
9 periods, .0175 .0189 .0224 
/3 restricted (.0013) (.0019) (.0022) 
Likelihood-ratio statistic for equal /J's (.05 x2 value with 8 df = 15.5): 
65.6 32.1 12.4 
p-value: (.000) (.000) (.134) 
Note: 48 observations, except 47 for 1880-1900 in columns 1 and 2 
(excluding Oklahoma) and 46 in column 3 (also excluding Wyoming, which 
lacks data on AGRY for 1880). The regressions use non-linear least squares 
and take the form, (1/T)•log(yit/Yi,t-T) = a - [log(yi,t-T)]•[l-exp(-.BT)]/T 
+ other variables, where Tis the length of the interval and Yit is per 
capita personal income for state i at time t. The other variables in 
column 2 are regional dummies for south, midwest, and west. The regression 
in column 3 adds the share of personal income originating in agriculture at 
the start of the period and the structural-composition variable (9 sectors) 
described in the text. The 9-period regression with a single value for /3 
comes from iterative1 weighted non-linear least squares. Standard errors 
are in parentheses, (J is the standard error of estimate. 
. .,, ~ .. .; ..:. .-
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Table 2: Regressions for Net ~igration into U.S. States 
~ 
Period ·b log(IIEAT) Density Dens. sq. R2 [IT] 
1900-1920 .0335 - .0066 - .0452 .0340 .70 
(.0075) (. 0037) (. 0077) (.0092) [.0112] 
II II1920-1930 .0363 - .0124 .61 
(. 0078) (.0027) [. 0079] 
II II1930- 1940 .0191 - .0048 .71 
II II(. 0037) (.0014) [. 0042] 
II II1940- 1950 .0262 - .0135 .83 
(.0056) (.0022) [. 0065] 
II II1950-1960 .0439 - .0205 .76 
(.0085) (. 0031) [ .0091] 
II II1960- 1970 .0436 - .0056 .70 
(.0082) (.0025) [. 0069] 
II II1970-1980 .0240 - .0076 . 73 
(.0091) (.0024) [.0071] 
II II1980-1987 .0177 - .0075 .73 
(.0057) (.0018) [. 0049] 
8 periods, .0261 indiv. - .0447 .0329 
fJ restricted (.0023) (. 0078) (.0093) 
Likelihood- ratio statistic for equal b' s is 17.0 (.05 x2 value with 7 df = 
14.1, p-value = .017) 
Note: 48 observations. The regressions use iterative, weighted least 
squares and take the form: RMGit =a+ b-log(yi t-T) + c1-log(HEATi) + 
' 
c2-DENSi t-T + c3-(DENSi t-T)
2 + other variables. The coefficients c2 and 
' ' c3 are constrained to be the same for all sub-periods. RMGit is the 
average annual net migration into state i between years t-T and t, 
expressed as a ratio to the state's population in year t-T. yi t-T is per 
' capita personal income as in Table 1. HEATi is average heating-degree days 
for state i (formed as an average for available cities in the state). 
DENSit is population density (thousands of persons per square mile of total 
area) for state i in year t. Other variables are the regional dummies, 
agriculture share in personal income, and sectoral-composition variables, 
as discussed in the notes to Table 1. The 8-period regression constrains 
the value of~ to be the same for all sub-periods. Standard errors are in 
parentheses, IT is the standard error of estimate. 
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Table 3: Regressions for Gross State Product across U.S. States 
(1) (2) (3) 




R2 [;]Period /3 R2 [;] /3 /3 
.63 .0157 .631963-1969 .0317 .36 .0154
(. 0067) [. 0070] (. 0060) [. 0056] (.0060) [ .0056] 
1969- 1975 .0438 .16 .0406 .41 .0297 .74 
(.0166) [. 0138] (.0162) [.0120] (.0101) [. 0081] 
1975-1981 - .0159 .03 - .0285 .17 .0258 .78 
(.0133) [.0145] (.0134) [ .0139] (.0108) [ .0072] 
.1188 .39 .1130 .62 .0238 .921981-1986 
(. 0294) [. 0205] (.0251) [. 0168] (.0091) [. 0079] 
.02164 periods, .0335 .0211 (.0042)/3 restricted (.0057) (.0053) 
Likelihood-ratio statistic for equal /J's (.05 x
2 value with 3 df = 7.8): 
75.6 31.2 1.7 
p-value: (.000) (.000) (.637) 
Note: 48 observations. The regressions use non-linear least squares and 
take the form: (1/T)-log(yit/Yi t-T) = a - [log(yi t-T)]·[1-exp(-/3T)]/T + 
' '•other variables, where Tis the length of the interval and Yit is per 
capita gross state product at time t. The other variables in column 2 are 
regional dummies for south, midwest, and west. The regression in column 3 
adds the structural-composition variable (54 sectors) described in the 
text. The 4-period regression with a single value for /3 comes from 
iterative, we!ghted non-linear least squares. Standard errors are in 
parentheses, u is the standard error of estimate. 
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Table 4: Regressions for Sectors of Gross State Product 
U.S. Share of Sector 
1963 1986 (3 R2 (l 
Mining .023 .022 .0240 
( .0074) 
.49 .0134 
Construction .048 .047 .0169 .20 .0110 
(.0203) 
Manufacturing .284 .199 .0460 
(.0082) 
.73 .0041 
Transportation .092 .094 .0257 
(.0176) 
.15 .0045 
Wholesale & .164 .169 .0093 .24 .0030 
Retail Trade (.0064) 
Finance,· Insur. , 
Real Estate 
.145 .167 .0149 
(. 0077) 
.43 .0046 
Services .105 .166 .0149 .27 .0036 
(.0077) 
Government .102 .115 .0161 .55 .0032 
(.0039) 
8 Sectors Jointly .963 .978 .0213 
(.0024) 
Likelihood-ratio Statistic for equal {i's is 22.4 ( .05 X 
2 value with 7df = 
14.1, p-value = .002) 
Note: 48 observations except 42 for mining. The regressions use 
non-linear least squares and take the form: (1/T)-log(yit/Yi t-T) = a -
' [log(yi t-T)] · [1-exp(-{3T)]/T + regional dummies, where T is 23 years and 
yit is ' the ratio of the sector's contribution to state i's gross state 
product to employment in the sector for that state. The sector for 
agriculture is omitted because of unreliable data on employment. The 
regional dummies are for south, midwest, and west. The 8-sector regression 
with a single value for (3 comes from iterative~ weighted non-linear least 
squares. Standard errors are in parentheses, u is the standard error of 
estimate. 
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19. West Midlands 
20. Wales 
21. Scotland 
22. Northern Ireland 
Italy 
23. Piemonte 
24. Valle d'Aosta 
25. Liguria
26. Lombardia 
27. Trentino-Alto Adige 
28. Veneto 















43. Region Parisienne 
44. Champagne-Ardenne
45. Picardie 
46. Haute Normandie 
47. Centre 





























aGDP data from Eurostat for Corse were combined with those for Provence­
Alpes-Cote d'Azur. 
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Table 6: Regressions for GDP across Regions of Europe 
(1) ( 2) (3) 
No other var's. Country dums. Country dums., 
AGRY, INY 
Period /i R2 [;] 
1950-1960 .0106 .06 .0105 .78 .0206 .80 
( .0051) [.0155] (.0038) [. 0077] (.0078) [. 0076] 
1960-1970 .0367 .39 .0279 .92 .0241 .92 
(.0066) [.0149] (.0036) [. 0057] (.0062) [. 0058] 
1970-1980 .0035 .01 .0184 .43 .0139 .44 
(.0035) [. 0098] (.0049) [. 0078] (. 0082) [. 0078] 
1980-1985 .0953 .60 .0116 .95 .0111 .96 
(.0122) [. 0212] (. 0048) [. 0077] (.0060) [. 0070] 
4 periods, .0183 .0186 .0178 
/i restricted (.0029) (.0021) (.0034) 
Likelihood-ratio statistic for equal /j's (.05 x2 value with 3 df = 7.8):
70.9 13.3 2.6 
p-value: (.000) (.004) (.457) 
Note: 73 observations. The regressions use non-linear least squares and 
take the form: (1/T)•log(yit/Yi,t-T) = a - [log(yi,t-T)]·[l-exp(-.BT)]/T + 
other variables, where Tis the length of the interval and Yit is per 
capita gross domestic product for region i at time t. The other variables 
in column 2 are country dummies. The breakdown of the sample is 11 regions
for Germany, 11 for the U.K., 20 for Italy, 21 for France, 3 for the 
Netherlands, 3 for Belgium, and 3 for Denmark. The regression in column 3 
adds the shares of agriculture and industry in employment at the start of 
the sub-period (based on a 3-way division of employment into agriculture,
industry, and services) for the sub-periods 1950-1960, 1960-1970, and 
1970-1980. The regression for the sub-period 1980-1985 includes the shares 
of agriculture and industry in GDP at the start of the period. The 
4-period regression with a single value for fi comes from iterative, 
weighted non-linear least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses, u 
is the standard error of estimate. 
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log(Y197o)a 0.363 -0.303 - 0. 031 0.047 
b
log(y1970) 0.404 -0.344 -0.044 0.066 
Growth: 70-80 -0.0075 0.0042 0.0021 -0.0031 
log(y1980) 0.329 -0.302 -0.023 0.035 
Growth: 80-85 -0.0011 0.0023 -0.0016 0.0024 
log(y1985) 0.324 -0. 290 - 0. 031 0.047 
Notes: The four northern regions for Italy are Piemonte (no. 23 in Table 
5), Valle d'Aosta (24), Liguria (25), and Lombardia (26). The seven 
southern regions are Campania (35), Abruzzi (36), Molise (37), Puglia (38),
Basilicata (39), Calabria (40), and Sicilia (41). The six northern regions
for the United Kingdom are North (12), Yorkshire-Humberside (13), 
North-West (18), West Midlands (19), Wales (20), and Scotland (21). The 
four southern regions are East Midlands (14), East Anglia (15), South-East 
(16), and South-West (17). log(y19xx) is the unweighted mean for the 
indicated regions of the log of per capita personal income, expressed as a 
deviation from the unweighted mean for the respective country, Italy or 
Great Britain (Northern Ireland is excluded here). Growth: xx-xx is the 
unweighted average for the indicated regions of the annual growth rate of 
per capita personal income, expressed as a deviation from the unweighted 
average for the respective country. 
aData from Molle (1980). 
bData from Eurostat. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Unweighted Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
Data for U.S. States 
Mean (l 
Growth rate of real per capita personal income, 
(1/T)-log(yit/Yi t-T):
' 









1980-1988 .0204 .0141 
Log of real per capita personal income, log(yit)' where Yit is 1n 
1000s of nominal dollars per person divided by the overall CPI 
(1982 base= 1.0): 
1880a 0.478 .545








1988 2.425 .194 









1980 .020 .019 
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Rates of net in-migration, mit: 
1900- 1987 .0034 .0107 
1900- 1940 .0051 .0119 
1940- 1987 .0019 .0113 
1900- 1920 .0107 .0187 
1920-1930 - .0002 .0115 
1930-1940 - .0086 .0069 
1940-1950 .0004 .0140 
1950- 1960 .0009 .0167 
1960- 1970 .0009 .0112 
1970- 1980 .0055 .0123 
1980-1987 .0020 .0086 
Population density, in 1000s of persons per square mile ofnit' 
total area: 
1880a .0388 .0521 
1900 .0559 .0797 
1920 .0771 .1145 
1930 .0906 .1342 
1940 .0935 .1379 
1950 .1062 .1553 
1960 .1247 .1817 
1970 .1416 .2081 
1980 .1504 .2099 
HEATi 5033 2116 
log(HEAT) 8.407 .539 
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Appendix Table 1, page 3 
(JMean 
Growth rate of per capita GSP, where nominal GSP is deflated by 




1969- 1975 .0159 .0149
1975-1981 .0207 .0146
1981-1986 .0159 .0260 
Log of per capita gross state product, log(yit) (yit is 1n 1000s 





1986 2.659 .142 
Structure variable, sit' for gross state product: 
1963-1969 .0282 .0037
1969- 1975 .0053 .0060
1975-1981 .0156 .0080
1981- 1986 .0158 .0112 
Growth rate of sectoral productivity (contribution to real GSP
per worker) from 1963 to 1986: 
Construction - .0223 .0117 





Services - .0053 .0041
Government - .0062 .0045 
Log of sectoral productivity in 1963, log(yit)' where yit is real 
GSP per worker in 1000s of 1982 dollars: 







Government 1.840 .216 
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Appendix Table 1, page 4 
(JMean 
Log of sectoral productivity in 1986, log(yit)' where yit is real 
GSP per worker in 1000s of 1982 dollars: 
Construction 3.697 .282 
Miningc 4.353 .456





Government 3.285 .161 
Data for European Regions 





1980- 1985 .0331 







Agriculture share of employment: 
1950 .319 .199
1960 .231 .165
1970 .142 .110 
Industry share of employment: 
1950 .373 .125
1960 .412 .106
1970 .430 .080 
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Appendix Table 1, page 5 
Mean IJ 
Agriculture share of GDPg: 
1970 .076 .051 
1980 .050 .035 
1985 .045 .030 
Industry share of GDPg: 
1970 .430 .079 
1980 .403 .066 









a47 observations (excluding Oklahoma). 
b46 observations (excluding Oklahoma and Wyoming). 
C42 observations (excluding Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, which have 
negligible mining). 
dLevels of per capita GDP for different years are based on 
non-comparable indexes. 
eData from Molle (1980). 
£Data from Eurostat. 
gExcluding the three regions for Denmark. For the regressions,
the 1980 values for Denmark were approximated from the available 
data for 1974. 
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FIGURE 1: GROWTH RATE FROM 1880 TO 198
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FIGURE 2: GROWTH RATE FROM 1880 TO 1988 
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FIGURE 4: DISPERSION, at, OF INCOME PER CAPITA 
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1880 1900 1920 19
40 1960 1980 
O'\...... 
FIGURE 6: PERSONAL INCOME PER CAPITA OVER TIME 





















































FIGURE 7: DISPERSION, at , OF INCOME PER CAPITA 
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FIGURE 13: GROWTH RATE FROM 1950 TO 1985 VERSUS 
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FIGURE 15: DISPERSION, a , OF GDP PER CAPITA 
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